Multiculturalists are mistaken about liberalism
By Sam Haroun, writer
Le Devoir, May 31, 2022
They call themselves liberals, but they have an elastic idea of liberalism when it comes to freedom of religion, as if freedom of conscience, the matrix of all freedoms, is exercised differently depending on its field of application: freedom of expression, assembly, demonstration, etc., are subject to regulations set by law. Freedom of religion, on the other hand, enjoys such a privilege in Canada, a country of institutional multiculturalism, that any attempt to limit the freedom of expression (wearing religious symbols) of religion in the slightest is automatically labelled as Islamophobia or systemic racism (a fetish term used by those who oppose Quebec’s Bill 21, which prohibits the wearing of religious symbols by four categories of public and para-public employees).
Yet Bill 21 deserves neither such honour nor such indignity: it is open to criticism like any other law, some finding it insufficiently restrictive, others finding it inquisitorial and fussy. It is excessive to assert that a law limiting the wearing of religious symbols in the state space, to which all users of all beliefs should identify, is contrary to individual freedoms.
Finally, the ethnocultural approach that classifies people according to ethnic and religious criteria and that is the hallmark of multiculturalism alters the freedoms of individuals since it locks them into their respective ethnocultures and creates differences in rights and duties according to the pressures exerted by one or the other. In this respect, let us see what great liberal thinkers think and say on these subjects.
John Locke to the rescue of Bill 21
The father of political liberalism, John Locke (1632-1704), wrote in his Treatise on Toleration (1686) that the prohibition of the wearing of religious clothing as a distinction from the rest of society is perfectly compatible with the enjoyment of liberties. Not that “the wearing of a cope or surplice is of such a nature as to endanger or threaten the peace of the state”, but an essential factor in the preservation of “civil unity” must be taken into account.
I would be forgiven for quoting John Locke at length, but his richly nuanced thinking demands it: “So that if they are restrained, it is not because they have this or that opinion as to the manner of divine worship, but because it is dangerous for many men to manifest their singularity in this way…. …] The same would be true of any mode of dress by which an attempt is made to distinguish oneself from the government […]; when it spreads and becomes a rallying sign for a large number of people who thereby enter into close relations of correspondence and friendship with one another, might not the government take umbrage at it, and use punishments to prohibit this fashion, not because it is illegitimate, but because of the dangers it might cause? “
For Locke, religious or ethno-cultural diversity should not interfere with civic solidarity or the cultural unity of the state: therefore, we cannot use our liberties to evade our common responsibilities.
John Stuart Mill against the assemblage of ethnocultures
“Free institutions are almost impossible in a country of different nationalities. In a country without a sense of community, especially if different languages are spoken, the common public opinion necessary to the operation of representative government cannot exist” (Considerations on Representative Government, 1861). Stuart Mill (1806-1873) believes that in a society where ethnocultures are recognised as such with special rights (multiculturalism), suspicions, rivalries, and clashes between ethnocultures are likely to increase and undermine the trust that is essential for civic peace.
In this sense, diversity and socio-cultural integration do not mix well. Let us remember that the above-mentioned authors are not the horrible Jacobins of the French Revolution who were quick to guillotine God the Father at the slightest opportunity, they are liberal thinkers concerned with promoting individual freedoms within the framework of a well-understood liberal democracy. On balance – and except for its provisions relating to the OQLF’s ability to search a company’s internal documents without a warrant – Bill 96 (*) is necessary to ensure the cohesion of the nation.
In Canada, which has enshrined multiculturalism in its Constitution, there is admittedly no state religion, but religion is in the state, and “each community” forges its own culture and allegiance as it sees fit.
Translated by Michel Virard
(* Bill 96 is a more recent law regarding language rights)
4 replies on “Multiculturalists are mistaken about liberalism”
Spot on. A certain minimal integration of individuals from foreign cultures is essential for a functioning liberal democracy. That willingness to accept the laws of the host country is what distinguishes immigration from invasion.
Some people who are paid by the Quebec government want to wear a funny hat or scarf that in no way impinges on their ability to do their job. Bill 21 prevents them from doing so, and thus is unambiguously a restriction on personal freedoms. I don’t see how that can be disputed in good faith. The question is: Are the provisions in Bill 21 justifiable in a free and democratic society?
As the Mr. Haroun notes, Bill 21 is (and should be) “open to criticism like any other law”. It’s important to have these conversations, especially when people broadly in agreement on philosophical principles take opposite sides of an issue.
Alas, I find the author’s arguments unpersuasive. While there are those who are too quick to ascribe a racist mindset to anyone who applauds Bill 21, there are also many principled arguments against it (see, for example, the third episode of Podcast for Inquiry) that do not disparage the motivations of its supporters. And while I broadly agree with Locke in that restrictions are justified on clothing choices that “endanger or threaten the peace of the state”, I do not accept the implication that a man wearing a yarmulke or a woman wearing a hijab rises anywhere close to this level.
Mr. Haroun argues, after quoting Locke at length, that “we cannot use our liberties to evade our common responsibilities.” And I think that’s true as far as it goes – but what Bill 21 demands is conformity beyond what is justified by Locke. Quebec teachers must be proficient in French (or, in a few places, English); they must have earned a teaching certification recognized by the Province of Quebec, which involves significant training and evaluation; they must teach the curriculum as mandated by the province; they are subject to any number of regulations and orders from the province, board of education, and principal of the individual school. Whether a particular individual wears a hijab or not is completely irrelevant to all of the above, and I fail to see what (to quote Locke again) “dangers it might cause” to allow teachers to wear a head covering of their choosing.
Perhaps this article, using Locke and Mills writings, is merely peripheral to the center issues posed by Bill21. In fact, to my knowledge, none of the supporters of Bill 21 have been using those peculiar arguments before. So, maybe the proper attitude toward this article is to enjoy its prose and move on. 🙂
This argument «I fail to see what (to quote Locke again) “dangers it might cause” to allow teachers to wear a head covering of their choosing» » is certainly the most often used argument against Bill 21. In other words: « there is strictly no consequences on the pupils of this display of religious strong convictions on the children ».
I beg to differ: whether you like it or not, teachers are « models » and, for younger children, they are parent surrogates, every day of the week for many months and many years. Pretending there will be not effect on those young minds is disingenuous. Now we might disagree on the type and extend of this «imprinting» operation but no, you cannot affirm there will be no effect.